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Leibniz, the “Flower of Substance,” and the Resurrection of the Same Body 
 
Although Leibniz’s doctrine of the flos substantiae, or flower of substance, has 
started to attract a great deal of attention from scholars in recent years, it continues to 
remain on the periphery of Leibniz scholarship, the discussions of it in the recent 
literature together amounting to little more than a story half-told.1 The aim of this 
paper is to build on these recent discussions and thus round out the story of the flos 
substantiae doctrine by offering an in-depth treatment of its content and context. 
Forming the backdrop to the majority of Leibniz’s discussions of the flos 
substantiae is a series of problems connected with the belief in the resurrection of the 
same body, and by way of an introduction a few words about this is in order. 
Historically many of the Judaeo-Christian tradition have held it to be true, and in 
some cases as even an article of faith, that at some future time all humans will not 
only experience a bodily resurrection, but will actually be resurrected with the same 
bodies possessed during normal life.2 Scriptural passages were often cited in defense 
of this view, but it was also commonly stressed that, unless humans receive the same 
body they had when alive, their revivification could scarcely be termed a resurrection 
in the first place.3 But in spite of its perceived support from both scripture and reason, 
the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body was widely considered to be dogged 
by two key problems. The first is this: how can anyone be resurrected with the same 
body? This problem turns on the fact that human bodies do not remain intact after 
death, and are instead subject to decomposition or other kinds of corruption such as 
(in Augustine’s words) being “devoured by beasts or consumed by fire, or reduced to 
dust, or dissolved into liquid.”4 This being so, it is not clear how all their parts can be 
restored so that the same bodies can rise again. In what follows I shall refer to this as 
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“bodily identity problem 1.” The second key problem often identified with the belief 
in the resurrection of the same body was this: how can everyone be resurrected with 
the same body? This problem stems from the fact that the matter belonging to the 
bodies of some humans may become part of the bodies of other humans, either 
directly (via cannibalism), or indirectly (since the remains of human bodies 
sometimes nourish plants and animals, which in turn may be eaten by other humans). 
In cases where this happens, there would seem to be a problem of ownership of bodily 
matter, with the same matter having formed part of two or more human bodies. Given 
that each bit of this disputed matter can only be returned to one person’s body rather 
than to the bodies of all those who may have a claim over it, it is not clear how 
everyone can be resurrected with the same body possessed during normal life. I shall 
refer to this as “bodily identity problem 2.” As we shall see, different versions of this 
problem have been formulated, some more thorny than others. 
It would be fair to say that concern with both bodily identity problems reached 
its zenith in early modern times, when belief in the resurrection of the same body was 
at its most widespread.5 It is perhaps ironic that Leibniz expended as much effort as 
he did to solve these problems given his position—stated in several texts—that while 
he believed in the bodily resurrection of all humans, he was not convinced that this 
required humans to be resurrected with the same body.6 But although Leibniz was not 
personally troubled by either of the bodily identity problems, he took it upon himself 
to solve them for the sake of others who were troubled by them. In his discussions of 
the problems, Leibniz put forward a doctrine of his own devising—that of the flower 
of substance—and claimed that it represented the best (indeed, the only) hope of a 
solution. Leibniz’s doctrine of the flos substantiae is to be found in only a handful of 
his writings, and those in which it is discussed all date from the early part of his career 
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(viz. 1669/70–86). From a commentator’s perspective, the most useful of these by 
some distance is an essay from 1671 entitled “On the resurrection of bodies,” which 
contains the lengthiest and most focused treatment of the bodily identity problems to 
be found in Leibniz’s corpus, along with the most detailed elucidation of the flos 
substantiae doctrine,7 and this essay will therefore be the starting point of our study. 
The structure of the paper will be as follows. In section I, I shall examine the 
first part of “On the resurrection of bodies,” which is concerned with the various 
bodily identity problems. Following the thread of Leibniz’s essay, in section II I shall 
examine the second half of “On the resurrection of bodies,” in which Leibniz details 
his flos substantiae doctrine. In section III I shall examine the remaining texts from 
the Leibnizian corpus in which the bodily identity problems and flos substantiae 
doctrine are discussed. Lastly, in section IV I shall evaluate the success of Leibniz’s 
doctrine in resolving the most difficult of the bodily identity problems. 
 
I 
 
I begin, then, with “On the resurrection of bodies,” which was written for Duke 
Johann Friedrich of Hanover in May 1671. Leibniz devotes much of the first part of 
his paper to a consideration of how the dominant metaphysical system of the day, 
namely atomism (which he refers to as “the Democritean philosophy”),8 could cope 
with the bodily identity problems.9 Atomism, as Leibniz notes, explains the essence of 
bodies by means of size, shape and motion (thus eschewing mysterious “innate” 
tendencies), and holds that all bodies are composed of minute portions of matter 
which are indivisible and indestructible. One consequence of this doctrine is that, no 
matter how a human body is corrupted or destroyed, the constituent atoms of that 
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body will remain intact. Leibniz then informs us that, according to the tenets of 
atomism, 
 
there is nothing which will prevent the same shape being reintroduced 
into the same mass of a given size; and hence a body can be remade 
numerically the same in the way that a clock is remade if the cogs which 
are removed are put back together in precisely the same way.10 
 
The upshot is that bodily identity problem 1 poses no threat to the doctrine of the 
resurrection in the event that one adopts an atomistic framework. With that 
established, Leibniz then considers whether the framework also allows for the 
successful resolution of bodily identity problem 2, that is, whether atomism allows for 
all humans to be resurrected with the same bodies. Leibniz in fact distinguishes three 
different versions of this problem, which I shall henceforth refer to respectively as 
bodily identity problem 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Each problem comes in the form of a thought 
experiment involving cannibalism, and in each case the cannibalism scenario depicted 
serves as a prima facie threat to the belief that all can and will be resurrected with the 
same bodies: 
Bodily identity problem 2.1: The first thought experiment, which is the same 
as the one I referred to earlier as “bodily identity problem 2,” simply supposes that the 
atoms from the body of one person find their way into the body of another. In such a 
case there would seem to be two humans who have an equal right to the same atoms, 
though obviously both cannot have them restored to their resurrection bodies. So to 
whom will God assign these disputed atoms in the resurrection? Leibniz’s answer is: 
to their first owner, a common response among those who considered this question.11 
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Bodily identity problem 2.2: The second thought experiment posits a man 
“raised solely on human flesh from infancy.”12 If God will return to their original 
owners all of the atoms devoured by cannibals, as Leibniz has already affirmed (see 
above), the question arises: what will be left for the cannibal who has eaten nothing 
but human flesh? At first glance: nothing, given that all the atoms the cannibal has 
obtained from nourishment will be returned to their original owners. In which case, 
the cannibal certainly cannot be resurrected with the same body. Leibniz responds by 
citing with approval a suggestion made by Augustine in his City of God, namely that 
the cannibal’s resurrection body will consist of the flesh “which he drew from the 
womb of his mother.”13 Leibniz refers to this flesh as the “seed” and “yeast” of the 
body, which recalls Paul’s remark in 1 Corinthians 15.35-8 that, in the case of wheat, 
what is sown is not wheat itself but rather a seed, with God giving a body to every 
seed.14 So although the cannibal must return all of the atoms his body obtains via 
nourishment over the course of his life, he does not need to return the seed of his 
body, as that derived from his mother. Consequently there is some matter which is 
truly his own and which can therefore compose his resurrection body. Yet traditional 
doctrine has it that every human is to be resurrected not as his or her original “seed,” 
but with a body whose size is that which that person had attained at maturity (or 
would have done had that person reached maturity).15 Noting this, Leibniz replies 
that, in order to make the cannibal’s resurrection body the right size, to the cannibal’s 
seed “other supplementary matter is added from the elements.” Hence in the case of 
the cannibal’s body, “this seed and as it were yeast of the original body will readily 
swell up to the right size by the addition of supplementary matter.”16 Although not 
explicit, Leibniz’s response supposes that bodily identity hinges on the identity of a 
person’s seed rather than on the identity of whatever supplementary matter with 
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which that seed happens to be clothed, such that a person’s body will retain its 
identity throughout the ebb and flow of supplementary materials as long as that 
person’s seed remains inside those inconstant materials. 
Bodily identity problem 2.3: The third scenario takes anthropophagi activity to 
its extremes, by supposing a cannibal who has not only fed exclusively on human 
flesh his entire life, but whose mother did so too. In this case, it seems, even the atoms 
which compose the cannibal’s seed will have to be returned to their rightful owners, 
thus leaving literally no atoms which the cannibal can claim as his own for his 
resurrection body. To this thought experiment Leibniz merely observes that the 
scenario depicted has never actually come to pass (“I admit that these cases can be 
imagined, although they have never happened. For who has ever lived on human flesh 
alone?”).17 This observation does not, however, prevent Leibniz from accepting that 
bodily identity problem 2.3 serves as a serious theoretical hurdle which must be 
overcome if the doctrine of the future resurrection of all with the same body is to be 
placed on a firm footing. 
Although Leibniz offers no summary of his findings, his position is clear 
enough— atomism has adequate resources to resolve bodily identity problem 1 and 
the first two versions of bodily identity problem 2 (viz. 2.1 and 2.2), but it does not 
have the resources to resolve the third version of the latter (viz. 2.3). Leibniz’s 
response to these findings, or at least his next step, is to question whether there is any 
need to insist on the resurrection of the same body at all. He offers three reasons for 
doubting this. First, and in what is clearly an anticipation of Locke’s memory criterion 
of personal identity, he claims that it is “the mind and memory of things done and 
done to us [which] makes us the same, not the flesh or bones.”18 Second, he notes that 
most of the parts which constitute a human body throughout its life do not remain the 
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same from one moment to the next, such that “even if not a single atom (aside from 
that point in which the mind is implanted) now remains in my body ... it will make no 
difference, nor will the loss be felt, since bodies insensibly change by a continual flux 
and renewal.”19 Third, Leibniz claims that the resurrection of the same body is not a 
doctrine with any scriptural support; to demonstrate this, he considers two passages 
(Job 19.25 and Ezekiel 37.1-14) and concludes that they “do not prove this identity of 
the flesh.”20 In this concerted attempt to undermine the doctrine of the resurrection of 
the same body, Leibniz offers a preview of some important components of his own 
flos substantiae doctrine, which he then goes on to elucidate in greater detail in the 
latter part of his essay. 
 
II 
 
Leibniz begins his presentation of the flos substantiae doctrine by recalling his earlier 
suggestion that each human body has its own seed. Leibniz identifies this as its 
“seminal centre” and (later in the text) its “flower of substance”: 
 
it is known that in each thing there is a certain seminal centre which 
diffuses itself, and contains as it were the tincture and preserves the 
specific motion of the thing. This is established from the regeneration of 
plants from seeds (this at least is uncontroversial), from the plastic power 
of the seed in the womb, and from the essences of chemicals. Therefore 
it is likewise in the bones: in our flesh, besides that terra damnata, 
phlegm, or caput mortuum, as chemists call it, a subtler part lies hidden 
in the spirits.21 
8 
 
 
That Leibniz here conceives the majority of the matter in a human body as a sort of 
common or gross “stuff” is clear from the terms he chooses to describe it, terms which 
reveal a debt to the alchemical literature. According to a lexicon of technical terms 
prevalent in the seventeenth century, terra damnata [accursed earth] is “the last of the 
five Chymical Principles, and is that which remains after all the other Principles are 
extracted by Distillation, Calcination, &c.” Phlegm is “the Fourth of the Five 
Chymical Principles” and is “the Insipid Water that comes first in the Distillation of 
Acid Spirits.” Caput mortuum [death’s head], meanwhile, is “that thick dry Matter 
that remains after Distillation of any thing, but of Minerals especially.”22 According to 
Leibniz, the seminal centre “diffuses itself” throughout these material dregs. His use 
of the word “tincture”—also an alchemical term—indicates that the seminal centre 
serves as the essential principle of the matter throughout which it is diffused, in other 
words, that the seminal centre imparts its own essence to that matter. This reading is 
reinforced by the name Leibniz gives to the seminal centre later in his essay, viz. 
“flower of substance.” In the alchemical tradition Leibniz is clearly drawing on, the 
term “flower,” when used in the expression “flower of...” was typically used to refer 
to a thing’s essence. Hence a thing’s “flower of substance” is the essence of that 
thing, existing within the material mass of the thing and diffusing itself throughout it. 
The fact that the flower of substance is self-diffusive suggests that its 
operation is not unlike that which many in the latter part of the seventeenth century 
attributed to plastic powers (or plastic natures). For thinkers such as the Cambridge 
Platonists, the plastic power served as an organizational principle in things, giving a 
substance such as an animal or plant the ability to take on and “subdue” new matter 
by investing it with the form the plant or animal possessed.23 Leibniz’s remarks 
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suggest that his “seminal centre” or flower of substance works in much the same way, 
such that the essence of an animal is spread throughout the matter of its body by its 
flower of substance. However the comparison between the flower of substance and a 
plastic power is not a perfect one, since it is clear from Leibniz’s remarks that the 
flower of substance is corporeal (whereas plastic powers were invariably considered 
to be incorporeal). According to Leibniz, the flower of substance is subtler than the 
common or gross matter which makes up the remainder of the body. This 
unquestionably establishes the corporeality of the flos substantiae, and Leibniz’s 
further claim that the flos substantiae is present within “the spirits” throws some 
useful light on the nature of this corporeality. The spirits, or animal spirits, were 
considered by many in early modern times to be the soul’s instrument or agent in the 
body, and although intermediary between incorporeal soul and corporeal body they 
are themselves very much corporeal, consisting of a subtle form of matter, akin to a 
thin fluid, which originate in the brain and circulate through the nerves of the body. 
According to Leibniz, the flower of substance exists within these spirits, from which 
it follows that is not identical to them. Since the animal spirits are more subtle than 
gross or coarse matter, the fact that Leibniz describes the flower of substance as “a 
subtler part” indicates that its subtlety surpasses even that of the animal spirits. If the 
animal spirits are thought of as a kind of thin fluid, then the flower of substance is 
perhaps best conceived as a kind of smoke or vapor running throughout the spirits 
(although Leibniz does not employ such a description himself). 
Now in the above quoted passage, it is clear that Leibniz intends to support his 
doctrine of the flos substantiae on (among other things) the “regeneration of plants 
from seeds.” Although not immediately obvious, this refers to plants which grow 
again after having been burned to ashes, which was a favorite example of alchemists, 
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and was often used to establish the existence of an indestructible (or at least 
incombustible) seed or core not just in plants, but in humans too, and consequently 
was often cited in connection with the resurrection.24 Although rarely made explicit, 
the argument for there being indestructible seeds or cores in humans was essentially 
one of extension—if lowly plants have such a seed or core (as was proved by the 
regeneration of burned plants), then humans must have them too. This appears to 
reflect Leibniz’s reasoning in the above quoted passage. However Leibniz finds 
further support for his doctrine in what would nowadays be termed “phantom limb 
syndrome.” The fact that people who have lost a limb continue to experience 
pinching, tickling, pain and so on in the lost limb, is explained by the fact that the 
“subtle spirit, in which the substance of the member was contained, as it were, is still 
present and exercises the same movements even now.”25 One might suppose that as 
the flower of substance is diffused throughout the entire body, part of it would remain 
in any limb that happens to be severed from the rest of the body, but Leibniz 
expressly denies this, stating that “when a member is cut off or rots away, this subtler 
part returns to the fountain of life, to which the soul itself is implanted.”26 This 
suggests that the flower of substance (which is the “subtler part” Leibniz speaks of), 
although corporeal and spread throughout the body in the spirits, is nevertheless all of 
a piece. That is to say, despite its corporeality, the flower of substance exists as a 
single unified thing incapable of being divided but able, when required, to contract 
itself back into the “fountain of life.” 
What, though, is this “fountain of life,” to which Leibniz tells us that the soul 
is implanted? Elsewhere in “On the resurrection of bodies” Leibniz refers to “that 
point in which the mind is implanted,”27 from which it is reasonable to infer, given 
that “mind” and “soul” are used interchangeably in Leibniz’s early writings, that the 
11 
 
fountain of life is a point containing the mind/soul. The hypothesis of the punctual 
soul was one of which the young Leibniz was very proud, though important details of 
the hypothesis—such as what kind of point Leibniz is thinking of (for example, a 
concrete physical point, or an abstract metaphysical or mathematical point)—are not 
provided, and are thus open to debate among Leibniz scholars.28 But at any rate we do 
know that these points do not possess extension, as in another text from 1671 Leibniz 
informs us that their “extension is nil.”29 Leibniz deduces from this that points are 
indivisible and (because he holds that corruption and destruction involves being 
divided) indestructible, as are the minds implanted in them. This is made clear in 
another paper written for Duke Johann and sent at the same time as “On the 
resurrection of bodies”; there Leibniz argues: “a mind can no more be destroyed than 
a point. For a point is indivisible and so cannot be destroyed. So let the body be 
burned up and dispersed into all corners of the world – the mind will persevere safe 
and sound in its point. For who will be able to burn a point?”30 Now as the flower of 
substance is able to contract itself back into this point, it is reasonable to suppose that 
it too is indestructible. This is confirmed in “On the resurrection of bodies” when 
Leibniz considers what would happen in the event that one person is entirely 
devoured by another: 
 
the seminal part, victorious over all violence, will gather itself into its 
own centre, the subtlety of which cannot be diminished by teeth, or 
dissolved by the acid of the stomach, nor likewise can it be converted 
into nourishment, since it is evident from the example of plants that the 
seminal part is even resistant to fire and survives in the ashes.31 
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Having established the indestructibility of the flower of substance, Leibniz’s last 
undertaking in “On the resurrection of bodies” is to detail what happens to this flower 
at the time of the resurrection, which he does in the following very condensed 
passage: 
 
It [the seminal part] will restore the coarse part, or rather its own coarse 
part, purged of filth to the extent it deserves, for when the world is 
liquefied by fires and heat joins homogenous things together, kindred 
things which retain the traces of similar motions will also come together 
again at that time.32 
 
Leibniz’s reference to fire recalls—and is almost certainly a reference to—the 
description of the Apocalypse in Revelation 8.5-12, where the earth is destroyed by 
fire. According to the above passage, the resurrection immediately follows this 
conflagration, and in a way is effected by it as it is the fires which cause the dispersed 
parts of deceased bodies to join together again. We have already seen Leibniz claim 
earlier in his essay that the seminal centre “preserves the specific motion of the 
thing,” which suggests that each mind produces, through the agency of its flower of 
substance, a kind of motion in the matter of its body which is unique to it. Although 
Leibniz states that this motion is preserved by the flower of substance, his claim that 
at the time of the conflagration “kindred things which retain the traces of similar 
motions will also come together again” suggests that matter which was once part of a 
human body does not (entirely) lose the motion impressed on it by that body’s flower 
of substance. Consequently, when the heat produced by the conflagration creates the 
conditions under which bits of matter with similar motion will collect together again, 
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the matter which was once part of a human body will reassemble and thus form that 
body once more. Crucial here is the idea that the motion imparted to it by the flower 
of substance determines the identity, or at least the ownership of matter.33 
But this is not Leibniz’s final word on the subject, as he immediately proceeds 
to offer an alternative account of the resurrection that does not involve or even require 
the regathering of previously-owned bodily matter:   
 
Or rather, since it does not matter which coarse part is most alike, the 
fires will create by fermentation one and the same body by means of the 
flower of substance, the mass and impurities having been corrected by 
transformation.34 
 
This passage is hardly perspicuous, but I suspect—partly on the basis of other texts 
examined in section III of this paper—that the most likely reading of it is that the 
presence of the flower of substance alone guarantees the sameness of the resurrection 
body, such that its diffusion through any matter—whether previously part of a 
person’s body or not—thereby gives rise to the same body. A corollary of this, which 
Leibniz affirms elsewhere as we shall see, is that bodily identity is also preserved 
throughout this life by the fact that it is the same flower of substance diffusing itself 
through whatever matter happens to constitute the body at any given time. In essence, 
then, same flower of substance = same body. This interpretation draws support from 
Leibniz’s claim that the glorified resurrected body is the same as the debased natural 
body,35 despite having undergone a kind of purification whereby the matter in these 
resurrected bodies is refined or, in the alchemical parlance of the times, fermented. 
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Leibniz’s thinking on this score no doubt owes much to views put forward by Paul in 
1 Corinthians 15.44: 
 
The body that is sown is perishable, it is raised imperishable; it is sown 
in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in 
power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. 
 
As we have just seen, Leibniz envisages the “glorified” (or “spiritual”) resurrected 
body as just a more purified version of the earthly body,36 and it is noteworthy that he 
takes this purification or fermentation to be an entirely naturalistic process, brought 
about by the fire of the conflagration and the action of the flower of substance, with 
no direct intervention from God. 
It is time to summarize our findings thus far. As we have seen, Leibniz holds 
that the locus of the soul is a point, through which it organizes the matter of the body 
through the agency of the flower of substance, which resides in the animal spirits but 
is of a subtler nature. From its position within the spirits, the flower of substance 
diffuses its essence throughout the remaining “coarse” or “gross” matter of the body. 
The flower of substance is thus coextensive with the body and remains so throughout 
the constant fluctuation of the body’s other constituent materials. However the flower 
of substance is not subject to damage or dissolution, which is the preserve of the 
body’s coarse matter alone. Should a part of the body be lost, such as a limb, there is 
no loss in or injury to the flower of substance, which contracts itself when parts of the 
body are lost. When the body is disintegrated in its entirety, the flower of substance 
contracts itself back into its point of origin, so to speak. At the time of the 
resurrection, however, it is in a position to diffuse itself through a quantity of matter 
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once again (which will be more or less refined according to one’s merit) and the 
resulting body is the same as the pre-resurrection body by dint of the presence of 
flower of substance, which imparts or impresses identity on whatever matter in which 
it is clothed. This, then, is the doctrine Leibniz advances in “On the resurrection of 
bodies.”37 We now need to see what further details we can elicit from the remaining 
texts in which the doctrine is elucidated. 
 
III 
 
Given that Leibniz often pressed the flower of substance into service as his solution to 
the problems of bodily identity outlined earlier, it is perhaps surprising to find that it 
was not developed with this purpose in mind. The first reference to the flower of 
substance found in Leibniz’s writings occurs in a short paper entitled “On the 
incarnation, or, on the hypostatic union,” written around 1669-70 as part of his 
Catholic Demonstrations project. In this paper, Leibniz is concerned with explaining 
how there can be a union between two distinct things such as (in the paradigm case) 
between the divine and human natures of Christ. Near the start of the text Leibniz 
states that among the things which can be hypostatically united are mind and body, 
which prompts him to claim that 
 
a created—and hence imperfect—mind is not united to every body, but 
only to the one in which it is rooted and from which it cannot be 
separated. In the human body, for example, it should not be thought that 
the soul is hypostatically united to all the corpuscles in it since they are 
constantly in passage; instead, the soul inheres in the very centre of the 
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brain, to a certain fixed and inseparable flower of substance which is 
most subtly mobile in the centre of the animal spirits, and it is 
substantially united so that it is not separated even by death.38 
 
Leibniz says no more about the flower of substance in this short text, yet these few 
remarks do provide important details about the doctrine. For example, they tell us the 
location of the soul (the very centre of the human brain) and the reason why the soul 
cannot be separated from the flower of substance, its seat within the body (because 
the two are substantially united). However in this, its inaugural appearance in 
Leibniz’s corpus, there is no indication of the grounds Leibniz had for endorsing the 
doctrine or any of the claims made about it. There is also no attempt to utilize it to 
resolve the bodily identity problems; that occurred only in its next appearance in 
Leibniz’s work, in the essay “On the resurrection of bodies” which we examined in 
section II. That essay, as noted earlier, was written for Duke Johann Freidrich of 
Hanover, and in the accompanying letter to the Duke, Leibniz provided a summary of 
the essay’s key points. The summary begins as follows:  
 
I am of the opinion that each and every body, humans as well as animals, 
vegetables and minerals, has a flower of its substance,39 distinct from the 
caput mortuum, which in the parlance of the chemists consists of terra 
damnata et phlegmate. This flower is so subtle that it even remains in the 
ashes of incinerated things and can, so to speak, draw itself together into 
an invisible centre, just as the actual mass of plants’ ashes may in a 
certain way be used as seed, and in the foetus or fruit of animals the 
punctum saliens already includes in itself the flower of the whole body. 
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Now I also believe that this flower of substance of a human being neither 
increases nor decreases, although its clothing and covering are in 
constant flux, and at one time is evaporated away, at another is increased 
again by the air or food.40 
 
These remarks add little to what is said about the flos substantiae in the texts 
considered thus far. One exception is Leibniz’s use of the expression punctum saliens, 
which reveals his familiarity not just with the alchemical literature, but with the 
scientific as well. The punctum saliens, or “starting point,” was a term applied to the 
part of a human or animal embryo considered to be the fountain of life. William 
Harvey, for instance, referred to the punctum saliens as “the first or rudimentary 
particle of the foetus” and claimed that “the edifice of the body ... is raised on the 
punctum saliens as a foundation.”41 Harvey identified the punctum saliens as the 
foetal heart, and speculated that the soul may exist in it.42 Later in his letter to Duke 
Johann, Leibniz finds a further scientific ally in Sanctorius, whose static experiments 
evidently struck a chord: 
 
If, then, this flower of substance always remains ... it is of little 
importance whether all the gross matter pertaining to us shall remain—
gross matter which is nevertheless constantly changing, and is either 
evaporated daily or, if it does persevere, is coagulated in filth that we 
must purge away. For it is clear that such exuviae are completely 
renewed almost every year, especially if we carefully examine 
Sanctorius’ experiments as described in the Medicina Statica. But if we 
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can change this gross matter in this life without affecting the identity of 
the body, much less will the glorified bodies be bound to it.43 
 
The claim that a person’s body remains the same despite the constant change of its 
material constituents is also to be found in “On the resurrection of bodies” as well as 
other writings in which the flos substantiae doctrine is expounded (as we shall see), 
but despite its importance for the success of that doctrine in securing the diachronic 
identity of a person’s body, Leibniz nowhere presents any evidence or argument for it. 
He was not alone in his failure to do so; most thinkers who agreed with Leibniz that a 
person’s body retains its identity throughout the ebb and flow of its constituent 
materials were content to treat it as a datum, and one which was intuitively obvious.44 
Following the letter to Duke Johann and the attendant paper examined in 
section I, almost five years elapsed before Leibniz discussed the resurrection or 
flower of substance again. The paper in which he next did so—entitled “On the seat of 
the soul”—was written in February 1676 as part of his Paris notes sometimes 
collectively referred to as De summa rerum. This short paper was seemingly 
occasioned by Leibniz’s reading of Robert Boyle’s essay “Some physico-theological 
considerations about the possibility of the resurrection” (1675), and although Leibniz 
found in Boyle’s essay much which agreed with his own views, he averred that his 
work on the subject “followed up the difficulties more precisely.” He summarizes his 
own thoughts thus: 
 
I think that the flower of substance is our body. This flower of substance 
subsists perpetually in all changes... It is easily seen from this why 
cannibals, devouring a man, have no power over the flower of substance. 
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This flower of substance is diffused through the whole body, and in a 
way contains form alone... I add only what was not observed by Boyle: 
that the soul seems to be firmly implanted in this flower of substance.45 
 
Anyone reading this passage without any knowledge of Leibniz’s earlier writings on 
the subject may be forgiven for thinking that Leibniz was inconsistent with regard to 
the nature of the flower of substance, as his claims that it is our body and that it is 
diffused throughout our body do not seem to be mutually compatible. I think it likely, 
however, that when composing this passage Leibniz was simply sloppy rather than 
confused. Specifically, in saying that “the flower of substance is our body,” it seems 
reasonable to suppose, on the basis of the texts examined thus far, that Leibniz was 
not employing the “is” of definition but rather the “is” of composition (or 
realization).46 In other words, he is not offering a definition or necessary conceptual 
truth about the flower of substance, but rather making the point that the flower of 
substance is the body’s formative principle which makes the body what it is. Such an 
explanation not only has inherent plausibility but also the virtue of being consistent 
with another of Leibniz’s statements in the above passage, namely that the flower of 
substance “in a way contains form alone,” which identifies it as the body’s 
organizational and formative principle. 
 Given Leibniz’s appeal to the notion of “form,” his belief that there was a 
considerable amount of common ground between his views and Boyle’s is perhaps 
surprising since Boyle did not couch his own theory of bodily identity in terms of 
forms at all. Instead, he identified the bones as the essential part of the human body, 
partly on account of a passage from Ezekiel (37.7-8) which tells of the bones of the 
dead being raised up and furnished with new sinews (which he took to mean skin, 
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nerves, tendons and ligaments),47 and partly because his own experiments had shown 
that human bones were “of a stable and lasting texture,” and “not apt to be destroyed 
by the operation either of earth or fire.”48 Moreover, Boyle did not consider a person’s 
soul to be implanted in his or her bones, or indeed in any other part of the body, his 
view being instead that at the resurrection God collects up a person’s bones, reclothes 
them in matter which may or may not have been part of that person’s body during 
normal life, and then unites the person’s soul to this newly resurrected body. Yet 
despite the sharp dissemblance between his own thoughts and Boyle’s, Leibniz was 
keen to stress the convergence between the two, although his desire to identify 
kindred philosophies was not restricted to Boyle’s; in fact throughout “On the seat of 
the soul” Leibniz cites numerous contemporary and near-contemporary thinkers who 
defended ideas which, in his view, shared common ground with key parts of his own 
flos substantiae doctrine, viz. Pierre Borel (1620-89), William Davidson (1593-1669), 
Athanasius Kircher (c.1601/2-80), Andreas Libavius (1540-1616), Claude Perrault 
(1613-88), Quersitanus (that is, Joseph du Chesne) (1544-1609), and Jacob Schegk 
(1511-87). Outlining the views of all these thinkers is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but suffice it to say that most endorsed a form of the plastic power hypothesis and/or a 
theory which involved the essence of humans being contained in seeds. What this roll 
call shows is that Leibniz’s flower of substance sat alongside numerous cognate 
doctrines which were part of the philosophical culture of his time. As such it is 
difficult to single out any particular thinker or thinkers as having a direct influence on 
Leibniz’s formulation of the doctrine, and certainly he offers no clues as to which 
thinkers did inspire him (directly or otherwise) in this matter.49 
After “On the seat of the soul,” Leibniz was silent about the flower of 
substance for a whole decade, and its next appearance—in the lengthy ecumenical 
21 
 
treatise Examination of the Christian Religion (1686)—is also its last in Leibniz’s 
corpus. In this final discussion of the doctrine, Leibniz begins with bodily identity 
problem 2.2, which posits a cannibal who has eaten nothing but human flesh for his 
entire life. After repeating the familiar points that the parts of human bodies are in 
constant flux and that consequently not every particle which is ever united to them 
belongs to their essence, Leibniz states: 
 
it should be said that in each and every body there is a sort of flower of 
substance, the nature of which may be illustrated from the principles of 
chemists, and which is preserved in the course of numerous changes and 
always subsists exactly as it was for each person at his birth.50 
 
Leibniz also repeats the claim made in earlier texts that one individual’s flower of 
substance is not susceptible to “confusion” with that of another, such that each flower 
will remain intact even if one person devours another.51 In the Examination of the 
Christian Religion, however, Leibniz offers no argument or other basis for this claim, 
nor does he suggest whereabouts in the human body the flos substantiae is located, 
nor mention anything about its mode of operation. This is perhaps unsurprising, since 
Leibniz’s metaphysics had undergone notable changes in the time between 1676 and 
1686, and some of the claims bound up with the doctrine of the flos substantiae in 
texts from 1671-76, such as that of the punctual soul, had been abandoned by the time 
the Examination of the Christian Religion was written. In that text Leibniz merely 
rehearses some of the details of the doctrine that had been worked out in earlier 
writings, but they are expounded half-heartedly, with little effort being made to 
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present the doctrine as a solid, plausible hypothesis.52 Consequently, the extent of 
Leibniz’s commitment to the flos substantiae doctrine in 1686 is unclear.53 
 
IV 
 
What is also unclear from our exposition is how exactly the flos substantiae doctrine 
is able to insulate the belief in the resurrection of the same body from the various 
bodily identity problems outlined earlier; in fact it is noteworthy that in none of the 
texts in which Leibniz elucidates the doctrine does he attempt to show how it resolves 
these problems, despite his contention that it does so (and even, in one text, that it 
offers the only means to do so).54 Instead, Leibniz seems content to claim that his 
doctrine guarantees sameness of body. It is left up to the reader, it seems, to determine 
how the flos substantiae doctrine resolves the various bodily identity problems. In this 
final section I shall consider how it fares against the thorniest of these, namely bodily 
identity problem 2.3. 
We will recall that bodily identity problem 2.3 posits a cannibal who has eaten 
nothing but human flesh for his entire life, and whose mother did likewise. Assuming, 
as Leibniz does, that all the flesh eaten by anthrophagi will be returned to its rightful 
owners, how can the cannibals be resurrected with the same bodies? On the basis of 
our exposition of the flos substantiae doctrine, we can surmise that Leibniz’s response 
would turn on his conviction that the bodies of the cannibals are not entirely 
composed of the flesh of their victims: only the gross or coarse matter of their bodies 
is so composed. The remaining part—the flower of substance—is not derived from or 
affected by the cannibals’ lifestyle, as it “always persists exactly as it was for each 
person at his birth.”55 Moreover, the persistence of the flower of substance is the joint 
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necessary and sufficient condition for bodily identity, as the flower of substance 
diffuses itself throughout whatever matter happens to clothe it (either in this life or at 
the time of the resurrection) and in so doing grounds it secures the identity of the 
body. So the cannibals can return the gross or coarse matter of their bodies to its 
rightful owners without thereby detrimentally affecting their chances of being 
resurrected with the same bodies. 
The details of the account just given should be familiar enough, but clearly 
they stand in need of fleshing out. We know that the flower of substance “always 
persists exactly as it was for each person at his birth,” but as yet we do not know how 
or when the flower of substance comes into being. Leibniz’s silence on this matter is 
curious given that it is key to the resolution of bodily identity problem 2.3. For 
example it could be the case that a person’s flower of substance originates at the 
moment of conception and is thus passed on from the mother, having been fashioned 
from her flesh. If this is so, then Leibniz would have no means of resolving bodily 
identity problem 2.3, as any offspring of a mother fed exclusively on human flesh 
would have a flower of substance made from “borrowed” matter which would have to 
be returned to its original owner(s). Alternatively, however, it could be that a person’s 
flower of substance was present in and passed on from the mother but was not 
fashioned from her flesh. Or it could be that a person’s flower of substance only starts 
to exist at the time of birth, perhaps by an act of special creation. Of these various 
possibilities, there is little doubt that Leibniz accepted the second; even though he 
does not tell us so outright, we can determine that it must be so from the fact that in 
his early writings he comes down very firmly in favour of traductionism, which holds 
that every soul was created ab initio and was thus present in Adam, from whom it was 
then passed on through subsequent generations until it was time for it to be actualized 
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at the moment of conception. For example, in 1671 Leibniz wrote that he can “explain 
by means of this body, in which the mind is implanted, that mind can multiply itself 
by traduction, without new creation,” and hence in the matter of human propagation, 
“there is no need to invoke God to perform the perpetual miracle of new creation.”56 
Although the few references to traduction in Leibniz’s youthful writings are all 
concerned with the propagation of souls (minds), his commitment to the flos 
substantiae doctrine entails that he could not have held that traduction applies to souls 
alone. For given his position that the soul is permanently fixed or united to the flower 
of substance, it must follow that if souls are created at the beginning and transmitted 
from one generation to the next, then the same is true of the flowers of substance to 
which they are permanently fixed or united. So Leibniz is committed to the position 
that every soul and every flower of substance was present in the body of Adam, and 
that they are transmitted together through subsequent generations until such time as 
conception leads them to become fully actualized.57 
We are now in a position to determine how Leibniz would resolve bodily 
identity problem 2.3. His answer, in a nutshell, is that neither the cannibal nor his 
cannibal mother will have to give up their respective flowers of substance to any of 
their victims at the time of the resurrection, as none of their victims have any claim 
over the matter which constitutes these flores substantiae. For the flowers of 
substance belonging to the two cannibals have persisted unchanged from the time 
of Adam, and will always persist unchanged, their constitution and essence being 
unaffected by the fact that both cannibals fed exclusively on human flesh 
throughout their lifetimes. So while it may be the case that at the time of the 
resurrection both of the cannibals will have to return all the flesh they took from 
their victims, this will not prevent either from being resurrected with the same 
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body, as this eaten flesh composed only the gross or coarse matter of their bodies, 
not the subtle matter of their flores substantiae, which alone are required for bodily 
identity to be retained. Consequently, the fact that no one has any claim to anyone 
else’s flower of substance, that each person’s flower of substance persists 
unchanged at all times, and that the presence of the flower of substance alone is 
what secures bodily identity, ensures that in the doctrine of the flos substantiae 
Leibniz has at his disposal the means to resolve even the thorniest of the bodily 
identity problems, and thus quell the concerns of those who, unlike him, were 
committed to the belief in the resurrection of the same body.
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